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Abstract-A new philosophical model makes particles and information at single points 
derivative. Space-time grids are not events but only ideal comparisons made by observers. 
Therefore the identity of space-time points and also of single particles is inherently a 
speculative assumption. The conservation of units can be derived and is not a foundation 
for events. An interaction is an actual change and can determine changed particles and a 
changed space-time grid from itself, both forward and backward in time. In contrast, 
relativity theory still retains the classical unit model in which information is localized at 
single points, merely positing more than one observer. One implication of the new model 
is that quantomechanical solutions meed not be limited by the requirements of relativity 
as is currently done. The model correctly predicts where difficulties should be found, and 
relates and explains many puzzles which are otherwise separated and inexplicable. 
SECTION I 
From one philosophical analysis [l] it follows that spatial location, point in time, and the 
identity of a single particle should be definable only retroactively, from processes of change. 
We predict that physics must eventually give up pointwise localization in space and time and 
single, noninteracting particle states. There will always be two or more particles, and their 
definitions, as well as those of places and times, will be definable only backwards, from 
interaction. 
Einstein’s [2] special theory of relativity already denies the definability of a space or time 
point without reference to the space and time of some observer. Absolute space and time 
points do not exist uniquely. The transformation equations named for Lorentz are a set of 
rules to transform observations made relative to one observer into those made relative to 
another observer. But in these equations all parameters in each observer’s system are still 
formulated along classical lines, namely as attached to independent single points of space and 
time. Thus, for each observer system, the concepts of space, time, and single particle are still 
quite as absolute as those of Newton. 
If it were true, as we will try to show, that single space and time points and a single particle 
are in some way inadmissible, a basic change would be involved also in the conception of 
certain phenomena. In relativity, a special place is assigned to the class of phenomena which 
are used to signal from one observer to another (light is the usual example). The properties 
of these signal phenomena are constrained by the role they are made to play in the theory, 
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a role dictated by what remains of absolute space and time in the theory. These properties 
are not of empirical origin, but are forced on these phenomena in order to make possible 
the signaling between two classical observers. 
It may well be, therefore, that if we decide to give up the vestige of absolute space and 
time, we should also find our description of these phenomena closer to the minimal empirical 
description. Their role as possible signals in relativity introduces speculative features in a 
theory still using absolute space and time, features which we will attempt to isolate and 
remove. 
By speculative we mean those features of theoretical descriptions which cannot be traced 
to decisions based on empirical findings. Such features are in principle open to being changed. 
We shall find in our inquiry that it is precisely those features which also seem to be at the 
heart of present difficulties in the theoretical description of recently explored phenomena. 
We began with this lead, that features due to the role of reconciling absolute space and 
time systems are speculative and open to change. We found that by separating out just these 
features we were also separating out just those unjustified assumptions most responsible for 
present difficulties in physics. 
Relativity, it is known, creates a host of dilemmas and contradictions when it is forcibly 
imposed upon the quantum theories of modern physics. We will inquire into the possibility 
that these contradictions vanish when absolute space and time are finally excised from our 
theories, and along with them what relativity imposes upon phenomena in order to reconcile 
systems of absolute space and time. The requirements of reconciling two such systems has, 
in relativity, been put ahead of empirical considerations. 
Let us now examine in detail what seems to be a basic philosophical inconsistency of 
relativity, and then pursue its effects in recent anomalies in more detail. 
The “signal properties of light” are due to its carrying of “information.” The classical 
notion of “information” contains a contradiction: information is purely about one point in 
space and time. Information is supposedly purely about there and then, and yet it would not 
be information if it were not had by someone who is somewhere lse. “Information” is 
supposedly both had somewhere, and yet also supposedly purely about one place somewhere 
else. Relativity keeps this point character of information. 
Light is made to embody the difficulty of two or more space-time location systems 
(observer coordinate frames). That each space-time system remains as is, and only their 
relation via signaling is affected is insured, but leads to the need for a sharp maximum signal 
speed, c, such that 
for all systems (observers). 
In relativity, the parameters are still single point descriptions, e.g., field strengths, F&(X, t). 
Relativity falls short of reformulating the parameters themselves, so that they would no longer 
be about independent single points. 
Now, if quantum theory is a body of theory and empirical data whose parametrization 
always involves more than one point, i.e., interactions, then we would expect relativity to 
contradict quantum theory exactly in those respects in which relativity requires single point 
descriptions and in the respects in which it forces certain speculative properties on light (or 
other usiDa, = c phenomena), to enable it to signal between such single points. It follows that 
whatever results from the information contradiction in relativity should be unnecessary and 
troublesome. 
Let us now examine more closely what is involved in space and time points. The labeling 
of phenomena by space and time must always be the function of someone who compares. 
A comparer marks off one motion on another. The intervals during which one motion occurs, 
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as marked off on another motion, say something about their comparison. They say nothing 
about each motion. Thus, if a given motion’s duration is expressed in terms of revolutions 
of the earth, or divisions thereof, the expression in days or hours says something about the 
comparer who has expressed one motion in terms of parts of the other. Nothing is thereby 
said about each motion as an empirical phenomenon. Rather, this interval parametrization 
of motions says something about the comparer’s activity, and depends upon the motion used 
as a standard in relation to the other motion being compared. 
Motions so compared are not actually interacting with each other in any way, nor is the 
observer impinging on either. Thus, time point definition already involves adding something 
to the description of phenomena, in regard to which the phenomena are in fact neutral. 
Similarly, a space location system is the product of an observer who relates different 
observables to each other in terms of the direction from the observer to them. A motion can 
then be described in terms of other phenomena which define a space interval. 
The interval covered is expressed in terms of other phenomena. These do not interact with 
the given motion and it is neutral with respect o them. The same interval supposedly exists 
without the motion. 
Thus motions are described in terms of static points derived from intervals between other 
phenomena with which the given motion is not in interaction. 
Motion thereby becomes defined as a “from-to,” in terms of static locations, so that 
instead of motion we have only the empty interval and its static points. 
The triumph of Einstein’s discussion of simultaneity was that he succeeded in eliminating 
the ambiguity of intervals by comparers who were not at rest relative to each other, so that 
we may say that motion finally becomes the comparison of static intervals. 
But have we not lost something by all this? How shall we distinguish between an object 
in motion and one at rest in each successive location? In interval parameters there is no way 
to formulate the question, but if our hand were on the object we would know which case 
obtained. But there is, of course, a parameter which expresses this difference: momentum, a 
dynamic (interactional) rather than kinematic (interval) parameter. 
As we saw, space and time location descriptions are artificial in the sense of relating, 
comparing, putting into interaction of an unreal sort, two phenomena or more which are not 
actually in interaction. Thus, the space-time descriptions do not distinguish between events 
actually in interaction with each other and events only being compared. The space-time 
description neutrally assigns relation to phenomena that are not relating, and conversely, also 
describes interactions as though they were merely intervals or comparisons. 
In quantum theory, on the other hand, the basic concept is that of interaction; and, we 
will argue, it is natural in quantum theories to regard location and time as derivative from 
interaction, and to distinguish actual interaction from mere comparison. 
Interaction is essentially a here-there A-B concept, labeled always by more than one 
parameter of each type (or equivalently by relative parameters, such as angles). 
Quantum theory does not require the assumptions of an absolute space-time with 
independent point-locations. More than that, it enables us to describe actual interactions, of 
which, it would seem, space-time location is a kind of artificial copy. For example, the 
comparer assigns space interval description to some motion, in terms of the change in angle 
by which he can locate it. From the start to the end the motion defines for the comparer an 
angle. But this is no real angle of some interaction descriptive of the motion. Rather, the angle 
describes the observer’s attempt to interact with the motion. Does the observer succeed in 
actually interacting with it? If not, then nothing empirical is said about a motion by the space 
location the comparer attempts to foist on it, as an artificial interaction. If yes, then only is 
the angle of empirical import, but then also the angle describes ome change, and cannot be 
reduced to a mere empty interval of a static comparison system. 
If space and time location intervals are viewed as angles of would-be interactions, and not 
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that interactions go on “in” static space and time interval systems, then at least we can argue 
that the dynamic (interactional) parameters are primary, and the kinematic (location) 
parameters must be taken out of the way descriptions are fundamentally fashioned. But in 
conventional theories which are built to accord with relativity (local field theories), the 
assumptions of kinematics are built into the descriptive parameters. One should therefore 
expect to find that these are troublesome features. 
What is more, it is possible that the Lorentz transformations themselves will become 
understandable and derivative if we consider space-time intervals as artificial interaction and 
their actual measurement as an actual interaction. 
Currently, the space-time systems (and their transformations) are taken as the most 
general and overall requirements, within which interactions are made to be placed. We 
propose reversing this and making actual interaction (and dynamic parameters only) the more 
general framework within which measurements are one kind. Space-time location parameters 
of actual interactions would be derived from actual interactions. 
Let us look more carefully at this “comparison” nature of time and space which we have 
been calling artificial. 
Time enters our theories at first as a parameter for the comparison of motions. A standard 
motion is chosen (falling sand, dripping water, the apparent motion of the sun) and all other 
motions are marked-off upon it, the moments of their commencement and termination. Thus, 
time intervals are introduced; and we end by assuming that all motions may be consistently 
represented in a single intercomparing system. Time interval is thus reducible to length, a 
difference in position of the system whose motion is our standard (the clock face, height in 
a cylinder, etc.). Even if the system is not a body in motion (say a light that periodically 
changes its color through the spectrum), there will always be an analogue of the length, the 
difference in position (here, the difference in color); and we require only that it be possible 
to define an equality of differences that is independent of where (or when, or at what color) 
the motion observed begins and ends. It is furthermore assumed in classical theories, 
including relativity, that this independence of when during the standard motion an interval 
is chosen, so far as its length in comparison to intervals beginning at other times is concerned, 
allows us to imagine that everywhere in the universe, and at all times, the unit interval is 
defined, provided only that it is defined once and somewhere. This last assumption is far from 
a trivial one, as was demonstrated by Hermann Weyl early in the century [3]. He showed that 
the assumptions restricted the freedom of the theory by as many parameters as are required 
to represent all of electromagnetism. This is because, without the assumption, we are free to 
redefine the unit interval of distance and of time at every point of space-time. 
This view of space and time, however, with all the classical assumptions, seems to have 
reduced all motion to a mere comparison of intervals. The difference is interaction (or possible 
interaction, as we will see below). Physics recognizes a distinction between kinematic and 
dynamic statements. Locations at successive times are only so many units of an observer’s 
arbitrary space per so many units of his equally arbitrary time. This description is purely 
kinematic. On the other hand, what distinguished motion from statics is impulse, change and 
transfer of momentum. Momentum always concerns interaction, transfer of momentum or 
impulse. It is always at least two momenta which are relevant to an interaction (see Fig. 1). 
A single momentum may be thought of as partial information about possible interactions 
with another momentum. 
Impulse, or change of momentum, is impossible at a single instant of time. From the 
viewpoint of momentum, or more exactly, change in momentum (interaction) therefore, the 
interval is clearly more basic than the time-points marking its beginning, end, or any other 
point between. It is therefore possible to consider time intervals as inherently related to actual 
interaction (or change in momentum), rather than as the difference between two points in 
an antecedently given system of artificial interactions between single independent points. 
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It is worth exploiting the concept of momentum as a true interaction concept to see how 
it can help us avoid the usual space-time (kinematic) ways of thinking. 
Let us view the momentum of a body as describing in part what we may expect ifthe body 
were to interact with another whose momentum is also specified. Momenta were invented 
only to be used in conjunction with other momenta; it is suvzs of momenta which are 
conserved, and it is the relative momentum transferred during an interaction which is an 
essential parameter describing an interaction. Thus, “momentum of a single particle” can be 
viewed as stating many possible specified interactions with a particle of another momentum. 
In the same way, the momentum of a particle also tells the possible interactions from which 
it might have emerged with its present momentum. Of course, any of these would have 
changed its velocity and direction, so that it now appears to be “coming from” a place at 
which it never was! Its momentum, therefore, does not really tell us where and when it was, 
but only about interactions that could have made it now seem to be coming out of the given 
direction with the given velocity. 
Any actual interaction thus generates for the particle a new set of possible interactions from 
which it could have come and could be entering further into. It thus generates a system of 
places and times at which it seems to have been and seems going to be. Any further actual 
interaction will change this system into another one. 
But now, which is more basic? Will, as the above shows, the space and time point systems 
be derivative from an actual interaction? Or must we place actual interactions (and the 
systems before and after it) into one consistent overarching system of space and time points? 
It should be clear that it cannot be the latter because, as we just showed, the space and time 
system is not literal for the particle but is only an expression of the interaction it comes from. 
Rather than saying the interaction it comes from, a system of spaces and times is laid out 
behind it, from which it does not actually come. 
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A point of view somewhat like ours has been developed recently from other arguments 
by Julian Schwinger in his sourcery theory [4]. 
There is little reason to want actual interaction and its generating of space and time systems 
still to go on in a space and time point system. Rather, actual interaction should have 
precedence and can redefine space and time points. (The actual interaction could be one of 
measurement.) 
Relativity can be retained to deal with the relations added onto phenomena by observers, 
without requiring that such considerations be the widest system within which all other 
descriptions must conform. Instead, we can make the Lorentz equations a limiting case of 
more general relations defined by interactions. 
We would predict that conventional theories will break down if they try to satisfy the 
Lorentz equations during an interaction as though the interaction occurred in space-time in 
antecedent locations corrected by the equations. In our view, interaction is not localized (tied 
to single points of space and time), but defines slofs or channels characteristic of the 
interaction, which are then spoken of as particles. 
For Newton, the connection between kinematic parameters and dynamics was accom- 
plished by introducing the idea of mass. It was mass which made bodies more than mere time 
and space points in the comparing system. In the classical system, a particle was regarded 
as a single moving mass point; that is to say, it was regarded kinematically in terms of the 
absolute space-time, and the notion of mass was included to allow for the dynamics. Modern 
theories are stated directly in terms of momentum. To do so fully would alter the notion of 
“particle.” We would retain “mass,” or the dynamical aspects it was intended to include, of 
course, but would eliminate the “point” aspect of particle or mass point. To define particle 
independently of motion through space-time (the artificial interactions of the comparer), we 
redefine it. We mean by particle a characteristic set of parameters in the descriptions of an 
interaction, for example, those of a resonant amplitude for an interaction of A and B in a 
definite quantum state, which characterize in conventional terms the particle C. We call such 
interaction parameter sets, “interaction slots.” 
The abstraction of the free particle, the particle not in interaction, is intimately connected 
with the presuppositions of an absolute space-time. In our sense it is therefore speculative 
and unnecessary, and where it appears in conventional theories we will suspect (and find) 
trouble. It is another consequence, perhaps the most important, of the older view. Only if 
space-time is taken to be an antecedent system of points both independent and more basic 
than the interactions said to go on “in” it, is the unequivocal path defining a particle in 
the old conception necessary, and a prior condition to be satisfied. Instead of single points 
of space and time, particles are groups of interaction slots characterizing each kind of 
interaction. One can then define a particle coming into an interaction either as a slot in that 
interaction or as a slot in the previous interaction, and these would be translatable into 
different derived space-time location systems. 
We would eliminate single particles as fundamental notions. 
SECTION II 
A host of anomalies can be predicted, found, and understood from this critique. We find 
them just where we expect them, namely wherever the requirements of single point space and 
time systems are put ahead of the requirements of interaction descriptions. Frequently the 
difficulty arises with one of the manifestations of single point systems, namely the single 
particle as a lone traveler in single point space-time. The view that a single particle traveling 
alone, and its path, should be definable already implies that single point space-time systems 
are preeminent, and that interactions must be described within such a system (or within 
corrections for two such systems). We have shown, on the other hand, that particles can be 
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considered as interaction slots, as basically not alone, and that therefore a single particle is 
a partial expression of some actual interaction. 
After presenting the following list of anomalies we will return to our main discussion in 
Sec. III. 
Consider first a simple example from quantum theory. A free particle with dejinite 
momentum (the interaction parameter) must be described by a wave infinite in extent in space. 
This means there is no greater probability ofjinding the particle here than there, or even at 
infinity. In practice, “wave packets” or other localizable descriptions are concocted to avoid 
such difficulties, but the connection between definite momentum and an unlocalizable state 
is fundamental. In the limit of definite momentum the state becomes nonlocalizable; the 
theoretician must impose the localization. This is in sharp contrast to an interacting particle. 
If the electron is bound in a hydrogen atom by its interaction with a proton, which interaction 
is ongoing and not momentary, actual and not merely artificial, then it has very definite 
localization properties definable in terms of (and derivative from) energy parameters of the 
bound system. The interaction generates the possibility of meaningful space-time mea- 
surements on the system. The space-time parametrization is complicated, the energy 
(interaction) description a much simpler way of looking at this system. The average spatial 
extension of a hydrogen atom can be defined; one defines it from the parameters of the 
electro-magnetic interaction observed (masses, charges, universal constants defining the units) 
and parameters of the interaction A-B, electron-proton, energy EAB and relative angular 
momentum lAB. The spatial extension of a free particle is not a meaningful question as no 
actual interval has been generated by any interaction. 
The mathematical absurdities and other problems which arise in quantum theory from the 
assumption of free particles support our view that the free particle is one instance of 
speculative results imputed from space-time comparison systems and their artificial 
space-time points. It seems that on-mass-shell (free) single particles have had a special (real) 
status in our theories only because we have given an unjustifiable role to single free particles 
in our thinking. 
Our analysis predicts trouble spots in an uncanny way, we find them if we continue to look 
where absolute space-time points and their relativity corrections are imposed. We find 
another such example in local fields, the name given to the mathematical function which 
defines the probability that particles of given quantum numbers (charge, mass, spin, etc.) will 
be created or destroyed at given points of space and time. Quantum field theory postulates 
that at every point of space and time one can define such a probability. As we would have 
predicted for space-time point definitions, the local field theories do not work! The theory 
produces only free particle fields. A realistic equation for interacting particle fields has never 
been solved. . 
Looking further, we note that these free fields cannot be chosen in certain, perhaps 
desirable, ways because the relativity postulates restrict the possible choices so much that, 
for all practical purpose, they determine them completely. The Lorentz transformations are 
called point transformations; and it is their point-for-point character which requires the 
point-by-point definition of the free fields, and leads to their “local” character, their being 
defined with reference to space and time. 
Once again, then, space-time as viewed in relativity, and the free particle concept, are seen 
to be part of the same conceptual scheme, and both suspect. Furthermore, Feynman’s 
interaction rules (for the interaction of electrons with light) which are successful are in a form 
that can avoid all reference to space-time and work only in terms of interaction variables, 
as we have defined them. When his solutions are formulated in space-time variables, they 
become extremely complicated mathematically; and their derivation from field theory is beset 
by problems. 
We would expect further difficulties where relativity forces certain characteristics upon 
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light, to make up for the needs of two space-time comparison systems, which characteristics 
then are maintained for light generally. Photons have to be assigned a zero rest mass, to insure 
their required signalling properties. Thus, any amount of energy, however small, is enough 
to produce arbitrary quantities of light quanta (E = mc’, where m = 0). Other particles, such 
as the neutrino, also have rest mass = 0, but the difficulty of producing arbitrary numbers 
of them from arbitrarily small energies does not arise. Why not? Because neutrinos occur only 
in conjunction with some other particle (possibly an antineutrino), with a finite threshold for 
production. Thus it is again the supposedly single particle which is making the dmiculty. As 
we emphasize, a particle makes sense only in relation to a partner, i.e., in interaction variables. 
Only derivatively from such interaction, and in it, can the particle be treated as “one at a 
time.” 
Photons were invented to account for the seeming localization of their energy and 
momentum in experiments where they interact with electrons. In such interactions they are 
localizable. Extending the localization demands to free particles, free photons, should make 
anomalies. It does. It is well known that there is no space-time probability (no wave function) 
for a photon. Thus it is not localizable at all. But, conversely, the experiments with photons 
and electrons in interaction, just mentioned, can also be accounted for quite accurately 
without a localized photon. 
Furthermore, we note that zero mass, unpaired-type solutions of the free particle equations 
and point local field theories lead to still another difficulty: the divergence problem (absurd 
results such as the infinite mass of particles and in general many infinite values for observably 
finite quantities). 
Thus, we find again that insisting on the speculative space-time formalism rather than the 
priority of interaction leads to unneeded complications and internal contradictions. We found 
them where we expected them when we pursued these speculative requirements. 
Similar arguments can be made briefly for some other well-known difficulties in con- 
ventional theory. In field theory, for example, Haag’s theorems [5] and related results establish 
that there is no acceptable correspondence (unitary transformation) between free-particle 
fields and the interacting-particle fields when we include interaction in the time-evolution of 
the system. Streater and Wightman find this “awkward” and “very inconvenient” [5, pp. 
166-681. We interpret it as the inadequacy of field theories to describe essential features of 
interactions by a formalism based on free particles and local fields. 
Another theorem within local field theory, the CPT theorem, requires the universality of 
the CPT (antiparticle-plus-space reflection-plus-time reversal) symmetry of local interactions, 
where each field is evaluated at the same space-time point, as a consequence of locality and 
relativity postulates. In such theories, it is postulated that there is a local point-to-point 
causality condition, which we would not expect to hold for infinitesimally near points x, y, 
for interacting fields. Empirically, it may well be that there are systems which cannot be fit 
to this procrustean bed, e.g., weak interactions in K-meson decays. There one observes a 
violation of part of the CPT symmetry (CP), but no compensating direct violation of the 
T-symmetry is known which would restore the supposedly universal CPT. 
The spin-statistics theorem, deriving from these same postulates, has also run into a 
possible exception. It seems to occur precisely in a situation where the possibility of particles 
existing in free states is problematic: spin and statistics for the quarks [6]. The quark statistics 
anomaly is currently circumvented by the assumption that free particle quark states are 
impossible because of the nature of the quark interaction! 
What alternative hypotheses and formulations are suggested or supported by the 
arguments we have presented? In the most widely used alternative to local field theories, the 
S-matrix model, we again find problems of the same sort. No realistic solutions have been 
given that meet the two main criteria of the theory: maximal analyticity and unitarity. 
Analyticity here is the analogue of relativistic point transformations, free-particle basis states, 
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and local causality in the field theories. Unitarity assures the conservation of probability in 
interactions and does not appear to depend on any of the speculative features we have 
identified. 
In the unitarity equation, interactions connecting initial and final states (i and f) in one 
process must agree with those connecting each to all possibly other intermediate states. 
Maximal analyticity limits the set of possible intermediate states, we believe, in such a way 
that they are not a sufficient set to allow us to satisfy the unitarity equation. The states are 
limited to those that qualify as “asymptotic scattering states” (in-states and out-states) in 
which the effects of interaction are neglected asymptotically (compare free-particle states). In 
quantum electrodynamics, Dirac points out, you cannot neglect interaction in fhis way; he 
rejects the whole approach [7]. We suspect that even in strong interactions the effects of 
dynamics in the interaction region can never be accounted for entirely in terms of the limited 
set of states conventionally allowed. (This is tantamount to rejecting asymptotic com- 
pleteness.) 
What would be the effect of allowing states that do not correspond to free particles, i.e., 
ones that appear only in the interaction region but do not have a scattering state as an 
asymptotic limit? What would such states be like? What kind of theory naturally provides 
them? Would they help resolve the problems we have identified as being due to the speculative 
assumptions of relativity and localization that have formerly excluded them? 
The states of interacting systems, we propose, are to be built up out of the complete set 
of basis states, both those which are analogues of what are now called free particles, and the 
nonasymptotic states as well. In S-matrix language, the nonasymptotic states are necessary 
for completeness in the sense of full unitarity; but they give contributions which violate 
maximal analyticity, and thus introduce violations of microcausality, within the interaction 
region. Nonlocal field theories provide states that are nonasymptotic in the S-matric sense, 
i.e., do not appear as in-states or out-states. 
Very little is known about nonlocal field theories, except that they have been considered 
physically unacceptable. However, acceptable nonlocal field theories could be constructed if 
we refuse to be limited by the strictures of relativity, free particles, and the limitation on signal 
velocity. Many nonlocal field theories, like the form factor theory for weak processes of 
Pietzschmann [8], suffer from well known limitations, including a macrocausality violation. 
But nonlocal theories, it appears, do not need to suffer these troubles. Indeed, well-behaved 
nonlocal theories which have been studied provide one of the most striking agreements with 
the consequences of the analysis given so far in this paper. In the work of Heisenberg [9], 
Kirzhnitz [lo], and very recently, Sudarshan [ 11 J, a very striking common feature has emerged 
from three different attacks on this problem. It appears that all self-consistent nonlocal field 
theories are of one type: those which require the introduction of states (as the analogues of 
particles or fields) which would not be admissible as free particles (not ordinary asymptotic 
states). 
These states (shadow states, ghost states) may have complex mass: 
MC= =M,+iM,. 
The imaginary mass can correspond to faster-than-light particles (if allowed as free particles, 
which we would not have). Mechanisms can be provided that appear to confine acausal effects 
to microscopic regions, especially in indefinite metric nonlocal theories [lo, 11, 12, 131. 
Analyticity is probably not maintained, but unitarity can be satisfied, though one must 
reconsider asymptotic completeness as a condition [14], as we would expect. The complete 
sets of states now add to the scattering states the nonasymptotic ones, and these new states 
may have complex eigenvalues of energy, rest mass and may have negative norm in the metric 
space. 
70 E. T. GENDLIN AND J. LEMKE 
In these alternative theories, most of which were in fact developed to deal with divergence 
problems and other pathologies of local field theories, one can picture analyticity modified 
in the interaction region by the existence there of new types of states and fields that introduce 
violations of microcausality. Within regions of order of size of some fundamental length, in 
processes where interaction energies are high and approaching some cutoff value, the effect 
of the new states tends to make all points within the region equivalent: there would be no 
separation of information at one point from that at another in the region, the “points” would 
be in effectively instantaneous communication. 
Such a picture is paradoxical when we fall back on our speculative notions of points, free 
particles, etc. Ultimately, even the nonlocal theories with their new states only patch up the 
holes in the usual fabric of theories derived from relativity and localization. If the topology 
of space-time is to be derived from interaction, interactions must be written down in terms 
that allow more general topologies. Our arguments suggest that this will not be done so long 
as interactions are considered to go on in a prior space-time. When we can formulate them 
in “internal” spaces of their own parameters, we would expect to find that we can derive a 
space-time whose topology is effectively similar to that suggested by these descriptions of 
alternative hypotheses to local, relativistic field theories and S-matrix theories. 
SECTION III 
Our examples have shown that there is indeed trouble exactly where the requirements of 
single point space-time are imposed as superior to the requirements of interaction. In many 
cases (for instance the nonlocal models), the needed interaction descriptions already exist but 
are held inadmissible because of the old view. It would thus have important consequences 
for theory building if, as we propose, interaction were considered basic and space-time 
location derivative. It would mean that the requirements of the latter could no longer limit 
the former. 
Our analysis has shown that space-time point systems are intercomparison systems. A 
comparer considers all phenomena marked off on all other phenomena (each is thus assumed 
to be indefinitely divisibl-hence points), and the total system of these intervals is the 
space-time point system. 
We showed that such comparison intervals are artificial interactions. Space and time 
parameters are derivable from interactions. They can be derived from actual interactions. Or 
they can be derived from the artificial interactions of the assumed interval system of all 
compared to all. The comparer pretends that for each motion he has taken all others and 
marked them off on it, and hence all its points have been generated. But these points are a 
purely speculative set, the comparer has not really compared all phenomena and even the few 
he has compared have not actually interacted. By marking one motion off on another, the 
comparer does not make actual interaction between them, nor, unless he freshly measures, 
is there interaction between himself and them. 
Why should this purely speculative set of artificial would-be interaction intervals and their 
points be considered a system of primary reality lasting across interactions, and to which all 
interactions must consistently conform? 
Our first conclusion, therefore, is that where a conflict arises, the space-time-particle 
description generated by actual interaction ought to take precedence over the nonactual 
interval system of comparers, as well as over the requirements of harmonizing more than one 
such comparer. 
Therefore, where it is currently desirable to employ descriptions of interactions that violate 
the requirements of point-systems and free particles, we have proposed lifting these 
restrictions. 
Our second, more strident conclusion is that single points and single particles are an 
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impossibility. They result from first setting up comparison systems, then reversing things and 
making the terminal points of the comparison intervals basic as if they had been antecedent 
and independent. The single particle traveling freely has to be recognized as hypothesizing 
the single point and path of points. 
“This” particle is identifiable as different from others of the same sort only in and by some 
interaction. The free particle is defined by the nonactual interaction of antecedent space and 
time points (it is the one at a given space and time point). 
Thus, the absolutely existing “this particle” is as nonactual as the points which identify 
it. Only actual interaction can identify a particle. Therefore, only interacting particles are 
possible; and a single particle is a partial description of an interaction, an interaction slot. 
Thirdly, we conclude that actual interaction can alter the system of space-time points. We 
saw that even in classical physics momentum could be described as a system of would-be 
interactions from which a particle could have come and into which it could go. Such systems 
of would-be interactions are only again another type of nonactual interactions similar to those 
of the comparers. An actual interaction changes a particle’s momentum and thereby changes 
the whole system of past and future would-be interactions because it changes the velocity and 
direction. Therefore, it is clear that an actual interaction is not simply one of those many 
would-be interactions, the one that occurred. To so view it is again to make the system of 
would-be interactions prior and more basic than actual interactions. We would reverse this 
order and allow an actual interaction to generate a space-time system. This view, while alien 
to most of current thinking in physics, is at the heart of gravitational theories, in which the 
properties of space-time (e.g., the metric) are derived from interactions by way of the energy 
tensor. 
It must be kept in view that parameters like frequency, wavelength, momentum, and 
velocity, involve space and time but are determinable from interaction. Thus, interactions can 
generate space and time but have not been thought of as generative in this way because, 
instead, they were thought of as having to go on in, and conform to, antecedent space and 
time. 
If there were no difference between would-be interactions and actual ones, the actual 
interaction would simply be one of those already included in the system of possible 
interactions (which a momentum states) for a particle. When it actually happened it would 
leave the basic system of possible interactions undisturbed, that is to say the changes due to 
the interaction would be located within that system and would change details within it, but 
not the system. 
The space-time derived from the interaction is different from that before the interaction, 
in which it was only a would-be interaction among others. 
At low energies, the overarching system of would-be interactions might give approximately 
correct results. But high energies translate kinematically into very small regions; and, thus, 
very small deviations can involve very high energy values. 
Relativity would be viewed as having taken a first step in recognizing that space-time point 
systems are a function of a comparer. The second step would be to recognize that actual 
interactions are superior to would-be interactions (such as comparisons and places and times 
of possible interactions). 
Localization (point locality) is really the principle of the “conservation” of space-time 
point systems, a conservation law nature may not respect! 
This analysis also indirectly supports the phi!osophical model from which it arose [ 11. Since 
the difficulties do appear just where the analysis would lead one to expect them, some credence 
is given to the philosophical model from which the analysis stems. The model is one of process 
and takes its rise from a conception of knowledge as “explication,” rather than as a copy 
of reality. In explication, “retroactive time” is the rule rather than an anomaly. One always 
asserts now what earlier phenomena “were.” When this is projected on linear point time, it 
12 E. T. GENDLIN AND J. LEMKE 
gives the impression of time doubling back on itself, as it would certainly seem to do if an 
interaction were described as occurring in an independent, prior space-time which can only 
be derived by working back from what is really prior interaction itself. 
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